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Abstract
This paper considers a semiparametric model of dyadic network formation under
nontransferable utilities (NTU). Such dyadic links arise frequently in real-world social
interactions that require bilateral consent but by their nature induce additive non-
separability. In our model we show how unobserved individual heterogeneity in the
network formation model can be canceled out without requiring additive separabil-
ity. The approach uses a new method we call logical differencing. The key idea is
to construct an observable event involving the intersection of two mutually exclusive
restrictions on the fixed effects, while these restrictions are as necessary conditions
of weak multivariate monotonicity. Based on this identification strategy we provide
consistent estimators of the network formation model under NTU. Finite-sample per-
formance of our method is analyzed in a simulation study, and an empirical illustration
using the risk-sharing network data from Nyakatoke demonstrates that our proposed
method is able to obtain economically intuitive estimates.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers a semiparametric model of dyadic network formation under nontrans-
ferable utilities (NTU), which arise naturally in the modeling of real-world social interactions
that require bilateral consent. For instance, friendship is usually formed only when both in-
dividuals in question are willing to accept each other as a friend, or in other words, when
both individuals derive sufficiently high utilities from establishing the friendship. It is often
plausible that the two individuals may derive very different utilities from the friendship for
a variety of reasons: for example, one of them may simply be more introvert than the other
and derive lower utilities from the friendship. In addition, there may not be a feasible way
to perfectly transfer utilities between the two individuals. Monetary payments may not be
customary in many social contexts, and even in the presence of monetary or in-kind trans-
fers, utilities may not be perfectly transferable through these feasible forms of transfers, say,
when individuals have different marginal utilities with respect to these transfers.1 Given
the considerable academic and policy interest in understanding the underlying drivers of
network formation,2 it is not only theoretically interesting but also empirically relevant to
incorporate NTU in the modeling of network formation.
This paper contributes to the line of econometric literature on network formation by in-
troducing and incorporating nontransferable utilities into dyadic network formation models.3
Previous work in this line of literature focuses primarily on case of transferable utilities, as
represented in Graham (2017), which considers a parametric model with homophily effects
and individual unobserved heterogeneity of the following form:
Dij = 1
{
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 + Ai + Aj ≥ Uij
}
(1)
where Dij is an observable binary variable that denotes the presence or absence of a link
between individual i and j, w (Xi, Xj) represents a (symmetric) vector of pairwise observable
characteristics specific to ij generated by a known function w of the individual observable
1See surveys by Aumann (1967), Hart (1985) and McLean (2002) for discussions on the implications of
NTU on link (bilateral relationship) and group formation from a micro-theoretical perspective.
2For example, the formation of friendship among U.S. high-school students has been studied by a
long line of literature, such as Moody (2001), Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010), Boucher (2015),
Currarini et al. (2016), Xu and Fan (2018) among others.
3It should be pointed out that the line of econometric literature on strategic network formation models,
which primarily uses pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) as the solution concept for network
formation, often builds NTU (along with link interdependence) into the econometric specification from
scratch. See, for example, De Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018), Graham (2016), Leung (2015),
Menzel (2015), Mele (2017a), Mele (2017b) and Ridder and Sheng (2017). This paper does not belong
to that line of literature but instead contributes to the line of econometric literature on dyadic network
formation models, which abstracts away from link interdepdence but usually incorporates more flexible
forms of unobserved individual heterogeneity.
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characteristics Xi and Xj of i and j, while Ai and Aj stand for unobserved individual-specific
degree heterogeneity and Uij is some idiosyncratic utility shock. Model (1) essentially says
that, if the (stochastic) joint surplus generated by a bilateral link sij := w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 +
Ai + Aj − Uij exceeds the threshold zero, then the link between i and j is formed. The
model implicitly assumes that the link surplus can be freely distributed among the two
individuals i and j, and that bargaining efficiency is always achieved, so that the undirected
link is formed if and only if the link surplus is positive. Given this specification, Graham
(2017) provides consistent and asymptotically normal maximum-likelihood estimates for the
homophily effect parameters β0, assuming that the exogenous idiosyncratic pairwise shocks
Uij are independently and identically distributed with a logistic distribution. Recently,
Candelaria (2016) and Toth (2017) provide semiparametric generalizations of Graham (2017),
while Gao (2020) established nonparametric identification of a class of index models that
further generalize (1).
This paper, however, generalizes Graham (2017) along a different direction, and seeks to
incorporate the natural micro-theoretical feature of NTU into this class of network forma-
tion models. To illustrate4, consider the following simple adaption of model (1) with two
threshold-crossing conditions:
Dij = 1
{
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 + Ai ≥ Uij
}
· 1
{
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 + Aj ≥ Uji
}
, (2)
where the unobserved individual heterogeneity Ai and Aj separately enter into two differ-
ent threshold-crossing conditions. This formulation could be relevant to scenarios where Ai
represents individual i’s own intrinsic valuation of a generic friend: for a relatively shy or
introvert person i, a lowerAi implies that i is less willing to establish a friendship link, regard-
less of how sociable the counterparty is. For simplicity, suppose for now that w (Xi, Xj) ≡ 0
and Uij ∼iid Uji ∼ F . Focusing completely on the effects of Ai and Aj, it is clear that the
TU model (1) implies that only the sum of “sociability”, Ai+Aj, matters: the linking prob-
ability among pairs with Ai = Aj = 1 (two moderately social persons) should be exactly the
same as the linking probability among pairs with Ai = 2 and Aj = 0 (one very social person
and one very shy person), which might not be reasonable or realistic in social scenarios. In
comparison, the linking probability among pairs with Ai = 2 and Aj = 0 is lower than the
linking probability among pairs with Ai = Aj = 1 under the NTU model (2) with i.i.d. Uij
4Starting from Section 2, we consider a more general specification than the illustrative model (1) intro-
duced here.
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and Uji that follow any log-concave distribution
5:
E [Dij|w (Xi, Xj) ≡ 0, Ai = 2, Aj = 0]
= F (0)F (2)
< F (1)F (1)
= E [Dij|w (Xi, Xj) ≡ 0, Ai = Aj = 1]
This is intuitive given the observation that, under bilateral consent, the party with relatively
lower utility is the pivotal one in link formation. Moreover, even though we maintain strict
monotonicity in the unobservable characteristics Ai and Aj , the NTU setting can still effec-
tively incorporate homophily effects on unobserved heterogeneity: given that w (Xi, Xj) ≡ 0
and Ai + Aj = 2, the linking probability is effectively decreasing in |Ai − Aj | under log-
concave F . Hence, by explicitly modeling NTU in dyadic network formation, we can accom-
modate more flexible or realistic patterns of conditional linking probabilities and homophily
effects that are not present under the TU setting.
However, the NTU setting immediately induces a key technical complication: as can be
seen explicitly in model (2), the observable indexes (W
′
ijβ0 and W
′
jiβ0) and the unobserved
heterogeneity terms (Ai and Aj) are no longer additively separable from each other. In par-
ticular, notice that, even though the utility specification for each individual inside each of
the two threshold-crossing conditions in model (2) remains completely linear and additive,
the multiplication of the two (nonlinear) indicator functions directly destroys both linear-
ity and additive separability, rendering inapplicable most previously developed econometric
techniques that arithmetically “difference out” the “two-way fixed effects” Ai and Aj based
on additive separability.6
Given this technical challenge, this paper proposes a new identification strategy termed
logical differencing, which helps cancel out the unobserved heterogeneity terms, Ai and Aj ,
without requiring additive separability but leveraging the logical implications of multivariate
monotonicity in model (2). The key idea is to construct an observable event involving the
intersection of two mutually exclusive restrictions on the fixed effects Ai and Aj , which
5A distribution is log-concave if F (x)λ F (y)1−λ ≤ F (λx + (1− λ) y). Many commonly used distri-
butions, such as uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, chi-squared distributions, are log-concave. See
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for more details on log-concave distributions from a microeconomic theo-
retical perspective.
6Equivalently, one could write model (2) in an alternative form as a “single” composite threshold-crossing
condition:
Dij = 1
{
min
{
W
′
ijβ0 +Ai − Uij ,W
′
jiβ0 +Aj − Uji
}
≥ 0
}
,
where additive separability is again lost in this alternative formulation.
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logically imply an event that can be represented without Ai or Aj . Specifically, in the context
of the illustrative model (2) above, we start by considering the event where a given individual
i is more popular than another individual j among a group of individuals k with observable
characteristics Xk = x while i is simultaneously less popular than another individual j among
a group of individuals with a certain realization of observable characteristics x. This is the
same as the conditioning event in Toth (2017) and analogous to the tetrad comparisons
made in Candelaria (2016). However, instead of using arithmetic differencing to cancel out
the unobserved heterogeneity Ai and Aj as in Candelaria (2016) and Toth (2017), we make
the following logical deductions based on the monotonicity of the conditional popularity of
i in w (Xi, x)
′
β0 and Ai. First, the event that i is more popular than another individual j
among the group of individuals with Xk = x implies that either w (Xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
Xj , x
)′
β0
or Ai > Aj, while the event that i is less popular than another individual j among a
different group of individuals with Xl = x implies that either w (Xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0 or
Ai < Aj. Second, when both events occur simultaneously, we can logically deduce that either
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0 or w (Xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
Xj , x
)′
β0 must have occurred, because
Ai > Aj and Ai < Aj cannot simultaneously occur. Intuitively, the “switch” in the relative
popularity of i and j among the two groups of individuals with characteristics x and x cannot
be driven by individual unobserved heterogeneity Ai and Aj , and hence when we indeed
observe such a “switch”, we obtain a restriction on the parametric indices w (Xi, x)
′
β0,
w (Xi, x)
′
β0, w (Xi, x)
′
β0, and w
(
Xj , x
)′
β0, which helps identify β0.
Based on this identification strategy we provide sufficient conditions for point identifica-
tion of the parameter β0 up to scale normalization as well as a consistent estimator for β0.
Our estimator has a two-step structure, with the first step being a standard nonparametric
estimator of conditional linking probabilities, which we use to assert the occurrence of the
conditioning event, while in the second step we use the identifying restriction on β0 when the
conditioning event occurs. The computation of the estimator essentially follows the same
method proposed in (Gao and Li, 2020), with some adaptions to the network data setting.
We analyze the finite-sample performance in a simulation study, and present an empirical
illustration of our method using data from Nyakatoke on risk-sharing network collected by
Joachim De Weerdt.
This paper belongs to the line of literature that studies dyadic network formation in a sin-
gle large network setting, including Blitzstein and Diaconis (2011), Chatterjee, Diaconis, and Sly
(2011), Yan and Xu (2013), Yan, Leng, and Zhu (2016), Graham (2017), Charbonneau (2017),
Dzemski (2017), Jochmans (2017), Yan, Jiang, Fienberg, and Leng (2018), Candelaria (2016),
Toth (2017) and Gao (2020). According to our knowledge Shi and Chen (2016) is the only
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previous paper that explicitly incorporates NTU into dyadic network formation models, but
Shi and Chen (2016) considers a fully parametric model and establishes the consistency and
asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimators. In contrast, we consider a
semiparametric model here where the functional form of the idiosyncratic shock distribution
is left unrestricted.
This paper is also related to a line of research that utilizes the form of link forma-
tion models considered here in order to study structural social interaction models: for
instance, Arduini et al. (2015), Auerbach (2016), Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013),
Hsieh and Lee (2016) and Johnsson and Moon (2017). In these papers, the social interac-
tion models are the main focus of identification and estimation, while the link formation
models are used mainly as a tool (a control function) to deal with network endogeneity or
unobserved heterogeneity problems in the social interaction model. Even though some of the
network formation models considered in this line of literature is consistent with the NTU
setting, this line of literature is usually not primarily concerned with the full identification
and estimation of the network formation model itself.
It should be pointed out that in this paper we do not consider link interdependence in net-
work formation. See Graham (2015), Chandrasekhar (2016) and de Paula (2016) for reviews
on the econometric literature on strategic network formation with link interdependence.
This paper is also a companion paper to Gao and Li (2020), which similarly leverages
multivariate monotonicity in a multi-index structure under a panel multinomial choice set-
ting, which incorporate rich individual-product specific unobserved heterogeneity in the form
of an infinite-dimensional fixed effect that enters into individual’s utility functions in an ad-
ditively nonseparable way. The structural similarity between network data and panel data
has long been noted in the econometric literature, but it should also be pointed out that the
network structure considered in this paper is technically more complicated than the panel
structure, as there are no direct ways in the network setting to make “intertemporal com-
parison” as in the panel setting that holds the fixed effects unchanged across two observable
periods of time. It is precisely this additional complication induced by the network setting
that requires the technique of logical differencing proposed in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the general
specifications of the dyadic network formation model we consider. Section 3 establishes
identification of the parameter of interests in our model, and also provides a consistent tetrad
estimator. Simulation results are reported in Section 4. We present an empirical illustration
of our method using the risk-sharing data of Nyakatoke in Section 5. We conclude with
Section 6. Proofs are available in the Appendix.
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2 A Nonseparable Dyadic Network Formation Model
We consider the following dyadic network formation model:
E [Dij|Xi, Xj, Ai, Aj] = φ
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, Ai, Aj
)
(3)
where:
• i ∈ {1, ..., n} denote a generic individual in a group of n individuals.
• Xi is a R
dx-valued vector of observable characteristics for individual i. This could
include wealth, age, education and ethnicity of individual i.
• Dij denotes a binary observable variable that indicates the presence or absence of an
undirected and unweighted link link between two distinct individuals i and j: Dij = Dji
for all pairs of individuals ij, with Dij = 1 indicating that ij are linked while Dij = 0
indicating that ij are not linked.
• w : Rdx × Rdx → Rdw is a known function that is symmetric7 with respect to its two
vector arguments.
• β0 ∈ Rdβ is an unknown finite-dimensional parameter of interest. Assume β0 6= 0 so
that we may normalize ‖β0‖ = 1, i.e., β0 ∈ Sdβ−1.
• Ai is an unobserved scalar-valued variable that represents unobserved individual het-
erogeneity.
• φ : R3 → R is an unknown measurable function that is symmetric with respect to its
second and third arguments.
In addition, we impose the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity). φ is weakly increasing in each of its arguments.
Assumption 1 is the key assumption on which our identification analysis is based, which
requires that the conditional linking probability between individuals with characteristics
(Xi, Ai) and (Xj , Aj) be monotone in a parametric index δij := w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 as well as
the unobserved individual heterogeneity terms Ai and Aj . It should be noted that, given
monotonicity, increasingness is without loss of generality as φ, β0 and Ai, Aj are all unknown
or unobservable. Also, Assumption 1 is only requiring that φ is monotonic in the index
7Our method can also be adapted to the case with asymmetric w. See Remark 1.
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w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 as a whole, not individual components of w (Xi, Xj). Therefore, we may
include nonlinear or non-monotone functions w (·, ·) on the observable characteristics as long
as Assumption 1 is maintained.
Next, we also impose a standard random sampling assumption:
Assumption 2 (Random Sampling). (Xi, Ai) is i.i.d. across i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
In particular, Assumption 2 allows arbitrary dependence structures between the observ-
able characteristics Xi and the unobservable characteristic Ai.
Model (3) along with the specifications and the two assumptions introduced above en-
compass a large class of dyadic network formation models in the literature. For example,
the standard dyadic network formation model (1) studied by Graham (2017) can be written
as
E [Dij|Xi, Xj, Ai, Aj] = F
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 + Ai + Aj
)
where F is the CDF of the standard logistic distribution. For the semiparametric version
considered by Candelaria (2016); Toth (2017); Gao (2020), we can simply take F to be some
unknown CDF. In either case, the monotonicity of the CDF F and the additive structure of
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 + Ai + Aj immediately imply Assumption 1.
However, our current model specification and assumptions further incorporate a larger
class of dyadic network formation models with potentially nontransferable utilities. Specifi-
cally, consider the joint requirement of two threshold-crossing conditions,
Dij = 1
{
u
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, Ai, Aj, ǫij
)
≥ 0
}
· 1
{
u
(
w (Xj, Xi)
′
β0, Aj, Ai, ǫji
)
≥ 0
}
(4)
where u is an unknown function that is not necessarily symmetric with respect to its second
and third arguments (Ai, Aj), and (ǫij , ǫji) are idiosyncratic pairwise shocks that are i.i.d.
across the each unordered ij pair with some unknown distribution. In particular, notice that
model (2) is a special case of (4). Suppose we further impose the following two lower-level
assumptions Assumption 1a and 1b:
Assumption (1a). (ǫij, ǫji) are independent from (Xi, Ai, Xj , Aj).
Assumption (1b). u is weakly increasing in its first three arguments.
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Then the conditional linking probability
E [Dij |Xi, Xj , Ai, Aj]
=
∫
1
{
u
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, Ai, Aj , ǫij
)
≥ 0
}
· 1
{
u
(
w (Xj, Xi)
′
β0, Aj , Ai, ǫji
)
≥ 0
}
dP (ǫij , ǫji)
=: φ
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, Ai, Aj
)
. (5)
can be represented by model (3) with Assumption 1 satisfied.
In particular, notice that we do not require ǫij ⊥ ǫji. In fact, ǫij ≡ ǫji is readily incorpo-
rated in our model. If u is furthermore assumed to be symmetric with respect to its second
and third arguments (Ai and Aj), then our model degenerates to the case of transferable
utilities,
Dij = 1
{
u
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, Ai, Aj, ǫij
)
≥ 0
}
,
where effectively only one threshold crossing condition will be determining the establishment
of a given network link.
Remark 1 (Symmetry of w (Xi, Xj)). To explain the key idea of our identification strategy
in a notation-economical way, we will be focusing on the case of symmetric w in the most
of the following sections. However, it should be pointed out that our method can also be
applied to the case where w is allowed to be asymmetric in (4), so that individual utilities
based on observable characteristics can also be made asymmetric (nontransferable). In that
case, model (4) need to be modified as
E [Dij |Xi, Xj , Ai, Aj] = φ
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, w (Xj, Xi)
′
β0, Ai, Aj
)
, (6)
where w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 may be different from w (Xj, Xi)
′
β0, but φ is symmetric with respect to
its first two arguments w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, w (Xj, Xi)
′
β0 whenever Ai = Aj . Moreover, Assump-
tion 1 should also be understood as monotonicity with respect to all four arguments of φ.
See Appendix (A.5) for more discussion on how our identification strategy can be adapted
to accommodate asymmetric w under appropriate conditions.
3 Identification and Estimation
3.1 Identification via Logical Differencing
In this section, we explain the key idea of our identification strategy. We construct a mutually
exclusive event to cancel out the unobservable heterogeneity Ai and Aj , which leads to an
identifying restriction on β0. We call this technique “logical differencing”.
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For each fixed individual i, and each possible x ∈ Rdx , define
ρi (x) := E [Dik|Xk = x] (7)
as the linking probability of this specific individual i with a group of individuals, individually
indexed by k, with the same observable characteristics Xk = x (but potentially different fixed
effects Ak). Clearly, ρi (x) is directly identified from data in a single large network.
Suppose that individual i has observed characteristics Xi = xi and unobserved charac-
teristics Ai = ai. Then, by model (3) we have
ρi (x) = E [E [Dik|Xk = x,Ak, Xi = xi, Ai = ai]|Xk = x]
= E
[
φ
(
w (xi, x)
′
β0, ai, Ak
)∣∣∣Xk = x]
=: ψx
(
w (xi, x)
′
β0, ai
)
, (8)
where the expectation in the second to last line is taken over Ak conditioning on Xk = x.
As we allow Ak and Xk to be arbitrarily correlated, the ψx function defined in the last line
of (8) is dependent on x. In the same time, notice that ψx does not depend on the identity
of i beyond the values of w (xi, x)
′
β0 and ai. By Assumption 1, ψx
(
w (xi, x)
′
β0, ai
)
must be
bivariate weakly increasing in the index w (xi, x)
′
β0 and the unobserved heterogeneity scalar
ai. We now show how to use bivariate monotonicity to obtain identifying restrictions on β0.
Fixing two distinct individuals i and j in the population, we first consider the event that
individual i is strictly more popular than individual j among the group of individuals with
observed characteristics Xk = x:
ρi (x) > ρj (x) , (9)
which is an event directly identifiable from observable data given (7). Even though event
(9) is the same conditioning event as considered in Toth (2017) and analogous to the tetrad
comparisons made in Candelaria (2016), we now exploit the following logical deduction based
on the bivariate monotonicity of the conditional popularity of i in w (Xi, x)
′
β0 and Ai without
the assumption of additivity between them. Specifically, writing (xi, ai) and
(
xj , aj
)
as the
observable and unobservable characteristics of individuals i and j, by (8) we have
ρi (x) > ρj (x) .
⇔ ψx
(
w (xi, x)
′
β0, ai
)
> ψx
(
w
(
xj , x
)′
β0, aj
)
⇒
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
ai > aj
}
, (10)
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Note that the last line of equation (10) is a natural necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for ρi (x) > ρj (x) under bivariate monotonicity.
Now, consider the event that individual i is strictly less popular than individual j among
the group of individuals with observed characteristics Xh = x, i.e.,
ρi (x) < ρj (x) . (11)
Then, by a similar argument to (10), we deduce
ρi (x) < ρj (x) ⇒
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
ai < aj
}
. (12)
Notice that the event
{
ai < aj
}
in (12) is mutually exclusive with the event
{
ai > aj
}
that
shows up in (10).
Next, consider the event that the two events (9) and (11) described above simultaneously
happen. Then, by (10), (12) and basic logical operations, we have
{
ρi (x) > ρj (x)
}
AND
{
ρi (x) < ρj (x)
}
⇒
({
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
ai > aj
})
AND
({
w (xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
ai < aj
})
⇔
({
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
AND
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
})
OR
({
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
AND
{
ai < aj
})
OR
({
ai > aj
}
AND
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
})
OR
({
ai > aj
}
AND
{
ai < aj
})
⇒
({
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
AND
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
})
OR
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
⇔
{(
w (xi, x)− w
(
xj , x
))′
β0 > 0
}
OR
{(
w (xi, x)− w
(
xj , x
))′
β0 < 0
}
, (13)
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The derivations above exploit two simple logical properties: first,
{
ai > aj
}
AND
{
ai < aj
}
= FALSE,
and second,{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj, x
)′
β0
}
AND
{
ai < aj
}
⇒
{
w (xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
xj , x
)′
β0
}
,
which uses only necessary but not sufficient condition, so that we can obtain an identifying
restriction (13) on β0 that does not involve ai nor aj . These two forms of logical operations
together enable us to “difference out” (or “cancel out”) the unobserved heterogeneity terms
ai and aj.
In contrast with various forms of “arithmetic differencing” techniques proposed in the
econometric literature (including Candelaria, 2016 and Toth, 2017 specific to the dyadic
network formation literature), our proposed technique does not rely on additive separabil-
ity between the parametric index w (xi, x)
′
β0 and the unobserved heterogeneity term ai.
Instead, our identification strategy is based on multivariate monotonicity and utilizes logi-
cal operations rather than standard arithmetic to cancel out the unobserved heterogeneity
terms. Hence we term our method “logical differencing”.
The identifying arguments above are derived for a fixed pair of individuals i and j,
but clearly the arguments can be applied for any pair of individuals ij with observable
characteristics xi and xj . Writing
τij (x, x) := 1 {ρi (x) > ρj (x)} · 1 {ρi (x) < ρj (x)} ,
λ (x, x; xi, xj ; β) := 1
{
(w (xi, x)− w (xj , x))
′
β0 ≤ 0
}
· 1
{
(w (xi, x) < w (xj , x))
′
β0 ≥ 0
}
,
for each β ∈ Sm−1, we summarize the identifying arguments above by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Identifying Restriction). Under model (3) and Assumptions 1 and 2, we have.
τij (x, x) = 1 ⇒ λ (x, x; xi, xj ; β0) = 0.
A simple (but clearly not unique) way to build a criterion function based on the above
lemma is to define
Q (β) := Eij,kl [τij (Xk, Xl)λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β)] , (14)
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where the expectation is Eij,kl taken over random samples of ordered tetrads (i, j, k, l) from
the population, and (Xi, Xj, Xk, Xl) denote the random variables corresponding to the ob-
servable characteristics of (i, j, k, l). According to Lemma 1, Q (β0) = 0, which is always
smaller than or equal to Q (β) ≥ 0 = Q (β0) for any β 6= β0 because τij ≥ 0 and λij ≥ 0 by
construction.
Observing that the scale of β0 is never identified, we write
B0 :=
{
β ∈ Sdβ−1 : Q (β) = 0
}
to represent the normalized “identified set” relative to the criterion Q defined above. Lemma
1 implies that β0 ∈ B0, but in general there is no guarantee that B0 is a singleton. The next
subsection contains a set of sufficient conditions that guarantees B0 = {β0}.
3.2 Sufficient Conditions for Point Identification
We now present a set of sufficient conditions that guarantee point identification of β0 on the
unit sphere Sm−1.
Assumption 3 (Full Directional Support). There exist a pair of x, x, both of which lie in the
support of Supp (Xi), such that Supp (w (x,Xi)− w (x,Xi)) contains all directions in Rm.
When w (x, x) is a component-wise Euclidean distance function, i.e., wh (x, x) = |xh − xh|
where h indexes each coordinate of possibly vector valued w (·, ·) function, Assumption 3 is
satisfied if Supp (Xi) has nonempty interior
8, which is analogous to the standard assumption
imposed for point identification on the unit sphere. When some components of w (x,Xj) have
discrete range space, we need to require that at least one component of w (x,Xi)−w (x,Xi)
have full support on R and the coordinate of β0 it corresponds to is nonzero, such that it
creates enough variation in w (x,Xi)− w (x,Xi) to guarantee Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Assumption 4 (Conditional Support of Ai). Ai is continuously distributed on the same
support, conditional on Xi = xi for any xi ∈ supp (Xi).
Assumption 5 (Continuity of φ). φ is continuous with respect to the second and third
arguments.
Assumption 4 together with Assumption 2 implies that conditional on Xi and Xj, for two
randomly sampled agents i, j, 0 is in the support of |Ai −Aj |. Assumption 5 then ensures
8When Supp (Xi) has nonempty interior, there exist x, x ∈ Supp (Xi) such that x >> x in the
point-wise sense and ×dxh=1 [xh, xh] ⊆ int (Supp (Xi)). In particular,
1
2
(x+ x) ∈ int (Supp (Xi)) and
thus 0 ∈ int (Supp (w (x,Xi)− w (x,Xi))). Consequently, one can construct a ε−ball around origin for
Supp (w (x,Xi)− w (x,Xi)) by choosing Xi from ×
dx
h=1 [xh, xh] and Assumption 3 is satisfied.
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that τij (x, x) = 1 occurs with strictly positive probability, which is required for the point
identification result.
Next, we lay out the lemma that will be used in the proof of point identification of β0.
Lemma 2 (Tools for Point Identification). Under model (3), Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and
5, for each β ∈ Sm−1\β0 , there exist xi, xj, x, and x all in the support of Xi such that
τij (x, x) = 1, (15)
λij (x, x; xi, xj ; β0) = 0, (16)
λij (x, x; xi, xj ; β) = 1. (17)
We are now ready to present the point identification result.
Theorem 1 (Point Identification of β0). Under model (3) and Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5. Then β0 is the unique minimizer of Q (β) defined in 14 over the unit sphere S
dβ−1.
Furthermore, for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
inf
β∈S
dβ−1\B(β0,ǫ)
Q (β) ≥ Q (β0) + δ,
where B (β0, ǫ) =
{
β ∈ Sdβ−1 : ‖β − β0‖ ≤ ǫ
}
.
Remark 2 (Asymmetry of w, Continued). In Appendix (A.5), we show how the identifica-
tion arguments and assumptions above can be adapted to accommodate asymmetry of w.
In short, the technique of logical differencing applies without changes, but the identifying
restriction we obtained become weaker. In particular, when w is antisymmetric in the sense
that w (x, x)+w (x, x) ≡ 0, the identifying restriction we obtained through logical differenc-
ing becomes trivial, and B0 = S
dβ−1. However, with asymmetric but not antisymmetric w,
it is still feasible to strengthen Assumption 3 so as to obtain point identification. See more
discussions in Appendix (A.5).
3.3 Tetrad Estimation and Consistency
We now proceed to present a consistent estimator of β0 in the framework of extremum
estimation. We will first construct the sample criterion function and show how to estimate
β0 via a two-step estimation procedure. Then we will list one additional assumption before
presenting the consistency result.
Define the sample analog of the population criterion Q (β) in (14) by
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Q̂n(β) :=
(n− 4)!
n!
∑
1≤i6=j 6=k 6=l≤n
1{ρˆi (Xk) > ρˆj (Xk)} ·1{ρˆi (Xl) < ρˆj (Xl)}
·
 1 {w (Xi, Xk)′ β ≤ w (Xj, Xk)′ β}
·1
{
w (Xi, Xl)
′
β ≥ w (Xj, Xl)
′
β
}
 , (18)
where ρˆi(x) is a first-step nonparametric estimator of ρi(x). The two-step tetrad estimator
for β0 is defined as
β̂n := arg min
β∈S
dβ−1
Q̂n (β) . (19)
The first-step estimation of ρi (x) := E
[
Dik
∣∣∣i, Xk = x] function to is standard nonpara-
metric regression problem. Computationally, one can fix each i in the sample, and regress
Dik, the indicator function for the link between i and k, on the basis functions chosen by
the researcher evaluated at observable characteristics Xk for all k 6= i. There are many tools
readily available to nonparametrically estimate ρi (x) in the first stage. For example, one
can use kernel, sieve, or neural networks. In Section 4, we use second order sieves with knot
at the median to estimate ρi (x) for the simulation study. Theoretical properties of our sieve
estimator ρˆi (x) can be found in Chen (2007).
It is worth mentioning that we can smooth each component of τij (x, x) to achieve better
numerical performance as long as the sign of the differences between ρi (x) and ρj (x) is
preserved. Recall that
τij (x, x) := 1 {ρi (x) > ρj (x)} · 1 {ρi (x) < ρj (x)} . (20)
When ρi (x) is close to ρj (x), the estimation of τij (x, x) may be imprecise and sensitive to
errors during data collection and analysis procedure. Therefore, we may wish to smooth both
1 {ρi (x) > ρj (x)} and 1 {ρi (x) < ρj (x)} such that the potential bias caused by the imprecise
estimation at the boundary point of 0 is smaller. In practice, we can do so by applying a
known smooth one-directional function H on ρi (x) − ρj (x). A concrete example of H is
the standard normal CDF, i.e. replace 1 {ρi (x) > ρj (x)} with 2×Φ
[
(ρi (x)− ρj (x))+
]
− 1
and replace 1 {ρi (x) < ρj (x)} with 2× Φ
[
(ρj (x)− ρi (x))+
]
− 1 in τij (x, x), where (c)+ is
the positive part of c, otherwise 0, and Φ is the CDF of standard normal N (0, 1). We use
smoothed τij (x, x) in the simulation part. See Section 4 for details.
For the second step, we estimate β0 by minimizing the sample criterion function Q̂n(β)
over the unit sphere Sdβ−1 after plugging in the first stage estimator τˆij (x, x). To exploit the
topological characteristics of the parameter space Sdβ−1, i.e. compactness and convexity, we
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develop a new bisection-style nested rectangle algorithm that recursively shrinks and refines
an adaptive grid on the angle space. The key novelty of the algorithm is that instead of
working with the edges of the Euclidean parameter space Rdβ , we deterministically “cut”
the angle space in each dimension of Sdβ−1 to search for the area that minimizes Q̂n(β).
Additional measures are taken to ensure the search algorithm is conservative. Simulation
and empirical results show that our algorithm performs reasonably well with a relatively
small sample size. Gao and Li (2020) provides more details regarding the implementation in
a panel multinomial choice setting.
For consistency, we impose the following assumption regarding the first-step nonpara-
metric estimator ρˆi(·) of the ρi (·) function.
Assumption 6 (Uniform Consistency for ρi (·)). ρˆi(·) is a uniformly consistent estimator
of ρi(·) for each agent i.
The usual kernel and sieve methods we mentioned above to estimate ρi(x) have been
proved to satisfy Assumption 6: see Bierens (1983) for results on kernel estimators and
Chen (2007) on sieve estimators.
Lemma 3 (Uniform Convergence of Q̂n (β)). Under model (3) and Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, and 6, we have
sup
β∈S
dβ−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)−Qn (β)∣∣∣ p−→ 0.
Finally, we state the consistency result of the tetrad estimator β̂n.
Theorem 2. Under model (3) and Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, βˆn is consistent for β0,
i.e.,
β̂n
p
−→ β0.
4 Simulation
In this section, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the finite-sample performance of
our two-step tetrad estimator. We start by specifying the data generating process (DGP)
of the Monte Carlo simulations. Next, we show and discuss the performance of our 2-step
estimation method under the baseline setup. Then, we vary the number of individuals N ,
the dimension of the pairwise observable characteristics d, and the degree of correlation
between X and A to further examine the robustness of our method. Finally, we show
how the method performs when w (Xi, Xj) is an asymmetric function of Xi and Xj , i.e.
w (Xi, Xj) 6= w (Xj , Xi).
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4.1 Setup of Simulation Study
For each DGP configuration, we run B = 100 independent simulations of model 3 with the
following network formation rule unknown to the econometrician for each agent pair (i, j)
Dij = 1
{
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0 + Ai > ǫij
}
· 1
{
w (Xj , Xi)
′
β0 + Aj > ǫji
}
, (21)
where the usual linear additivity is excluded by construction that Dij equals the product of
two indicator functions. In (21), Dij equals one if i and j are connected, zero otherwise. Xi
and Xj are dx × 1 vectors of observable characteristics of individual i and j, respectively.
w (Xi, Xj) is a known vector-valued function mapping (Xi, Xj) pairs to a dw × 1 vector. β0
is a dβ × 1 vector of structural parameter of interest. We maintain dx = dw = dβ = d in all
our configurations. Ai represents the unobservable scalar valued fixed effect that is possibly
correlated with Xi. ǫij is the scalar valued iid random shocks independent of X and A.
In our baseline DGP configuration where we fix N = 100 and d = 3, each coordinate
of Xi is drawn independently across both individuals i and dimensions d from a uniform
distribution on [−0.5, 0.5]. Then we compute W (d)ij , the d
th coordinate of w (Xi, Xj) vector,
as W
(d)
ij =
∣∣∣X(d)i −X(d)j ∣∣∣. Note that for the baseline setup we maintain the symmetry of Wij
in (Xi, Xj) pairs, i.e., Wij = Wji. Later on, we will relax this restriction and investigate the
asymmetric case where Wij 6= Wji.
Next, we construct the unobserved heterogeneity Ai. To allow for the correlation between
Ai and Xi, we draw iid sequence ξi independently from Xi from a uniform distribution on
[−0.5, 0.5] and let Ai = corr × X
(1)
i + (1− corr) × ξi, where corr controls the degree of
correlation between Xi and Ai and is set to be 0.2. Later on, we will vary the correlation
to see how robust our estimator is against correlation between A and X. As for the random
utility shock ǫij , we draw them from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Note that our estimation
method does not require the knowledge of the distribution of Ai or ǫij . We set the true
β0 ∈ Rdβ to be (1, ..., 1)
′
, and estimate the direction of β0, represented by the normalized
vector β0 := β0/ ‖β0‖ on the unit sphere S
dβ−1 because the scale of β0 is not identified. We
shall maintain the specification of (ǫ, A, β0) and the network formation rule (21) to be the
same across all simulations.
Our method allows for asymmetry of Wij in (Xi, Xj) pairs. To numerically show this,
for the last coordinate d = d we compute W
(d)
ij as
∣∣∣∣2X(d)i −X(d)j ∣∣∣∣ × (2/3). The reason for
multiplying 2/3 is to make the size of W
(d)
ij similar to other coordinates of Wij . This way
we generate asymmetry because W
(d)
ij 6= W
(d)
ji unless
∣∣∣X(d)i ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣X(d)j ∣∣∣, which is a probability
zero event under our DGP setting. For other dimensions d = 1, ..., d − 1, we maintain the
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baseline assumption. As a robustness check, we also vary N and d under asymmetry to show
how our method works.
To summarize, for each of the B = 100 simulations we randomly generate data on the
characteristics of and the network structure among individuals. Then based on the observable
(Xi,Wij, Dij)i,j∈{1,...,N} matrix we construct our two-step estimator β̂ for the true parameter
of interest β0. Specifically, we use a sieve estimator with 2nd-order spline with its knot
at median for the first-stage nonparametric estimation of ρi (·). The spline is chosen to
ensure a relatively small number of regressors in the nonparametric regression considering
the small size of N . In the second stage, we adapt to the adaptive-gird search on the unit
sphere algorithm developed in Gao and Li (2020) to calculate β̂ that minimizes the sample
criterion function Q̂ (β) over the unit sphere. We refer interested readers to that paper for
more technical details. It should be noted that constrained by computational power, when
calculating the sample criterion Q̂(β) for each β ∈ Sd−1 we randomly draw M = 1000 (i, j)
pairs of individuals and vary across all possible (k, l) pairs excluding i or j. One can improve
those results by increasing M when computational constraint is not present. Lastly, we
compare our estimator β̂ with the true parameter value β0 based on several performance
metrics including rMSE, mean norm deviations (MND), and maximum absolute deviation
(MAB).
4.2 Results under Symmetric Pairwise Observable Characteristics
Baseline Results
For the baseline configuration, we fix number of individuals N = 100, dimension of Wij
d = 3, number of (i, j) pairs used in evaluating Q̂(β) M = 1000, and number of simulations
B = 100. We define for each simulation round b the set estimator Θ̂b as the set of points
that achieve the minimum of Q̂(β) over the unit sphere Sd−1. We further define for each
simulation b = 1, ..., B and each dimension d = 1, ..., d of β
β̂lb,d := min Θ̂b,d, β̂
u
b,d := max Θ̂b,d, β̂
m
b,d :=
1
2
(
β̂lb,d + β̂
u
b,d
)
,
where β̂lb,d is the minimum value along dimension d for simulation round b of the identified
set Θ̂b, β̂
u
b,d is the maximum value along dimension d for simulation round b of the identi-
fied set Θ̂b, and β̂
m
b,d is the middle point along dimension d for simulation round b of the
identified set Θ̂b. One can consider β̂
m as the point estimator for β0 when the assumptions
for point identification are satisfied. Note by construction for each simulation round b, the
identified set Θ̂b is a subset of the rectangle Ξ̂b := ×dd=1
[
β̂lb,d, β̂
u
b,d
]
. We calculate the baseline
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Table 1: Baseline Performance
β1 β2 β3
bias 1
B
∑
b
(
βˆmb,d − β0,d
)
-0.0021 0.0052 -0.0053
upper bias 1
B
∑
b
(
βˆub,d − β0,d
)
0.0048 0.0118 -0.0002
lower bias 1
B
∑
b
(
βˆlb,d − β0,d
)
-0.0091 -0.0015 -0.0105
mean(u− l) 1
B
∑
b
(
βˆub,d − βˆ
l
b,d
)
0.0138 0.0132 0.0103
root MSE
√
1
B
∑
b
∥∥∥βˆmb − β0∥∥∥2 0.0488
mean norm deviations 1
B
∑
b
∥∥∥βˆmb − β0∥∥∥ 0.0417
max absolute deviations maxd
∣∣∣ 1
B
∑
b
(
βˆmb,d − β0,d
)∣∣∣ 0.0053
performance using β̂l, β̂u, β̂m respectively.
Below in Table 1 we report the performance of our estimators. In the first row of Table
1 we calculate the mean bias across B = 100 simulations using β̂m along each dimension
d = 1, ..., d. The result shows the estimation bias is very small across all dimensions with
a magnitude between -0.0053 and 0.0052. Similar performance is observed using β̂u and β̂l
as shown in row 2 and 3. We do not find any sign of persistent over/under- estimation of
β0 across each dimension. Row 4 measures the average width of the rectangle Ξ̂ along each
dimension. The size of Ξ̂ is very small, indicating a very tight area for the estimated set.
In the second part of Table 1 we report rMSE, MND, and MAB, all of which are small in
magnitude and provide evidence that our estimator work well in finite sample.
Results Varying N and d
In this section we vary the number of individuals N and dimension of Wij d to examine
how robust our method is against these variations. We investigate the performance when
N = 50, 100, 200 and d = 3, 4, respectively. We maintain the symmetry in Wij and other
distributional assumptions as in baseline setup. M , the number of (i, j) pairs used to evaluate
objective function, is set to be 1000 in all simulations. Note that one could make M larger
for larger N to better capture the more information available from the increase in N . In this
sense, our results are conservative below. Results are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Results Varying N and d
d = 3 rMSE MND MAB d = 4 rMSE MND MAB
N = 50 0.0839 0.0724 0.0051 N = 50 0.1119 0.1030 0.0091
N = 100 0.0488 0.0417 0.0053 N = 100 0.0692 0.0647 0.0038
N = 200 0.0334 0.029 0.0043 N = 200 0.0543 0.0523 0.0038
The left part of Table 2 shows the performance of our estimator when N changes and
d is fixed at 3. When N increases, rMSE, MND and sum of absolute bias all show moder-
ate decline in magnitude, indicating the performance is improving. Similar pattern is also
observed for d = 4. This is intuitive because with more individuals in the sample, one can
achieve more accurate estimation of ρi (·) and calculation of Q̂ (β). Moreover, we can see
even with a relatively small sample size of N = 50, the rMSE is 0.0839 when d = 3 and
0.1119 when d = 4, showing that our method is informative and accurate. When N = 200,
the performance is very good, with rMSE being as small as 0.0334 and 0.0543 for d = 3
and d = 4, respectively. When we fix N and compare between d = 3 and d = 4, it is clear
the increase in d adversely affects the performance of our estimator, with rMSE and MND
increasing for each N . Overall, Table 2 provides evidence that our method is able to estimate
β0 accurately even with a small sample size.
Results Varying corr
Correlation between observable characteristics X and unobservable fixed effect A is impor-
tant in network formation models. We show how our estimator performs when the correlation
between X and A varies. Recall that we construct Ai as
Ai = corr ×X
(1)
i + (1− corr)× ξi, (22)
where ξi is iid uniform on [−0.5, 0.5] and is independent of Xi. We set corr to be 0.2 in the
baseline configuration. In Table 3, we vary corr from 0.20 to 0.90 while fixing N = 100,
d = 3, M = 1000 and obtain the performance of our estimator among B = 100 simulations
when Wij is symmetric.
It can be seen from Table 3 that even though increase in corr adversely affects the
performance of our estimator, the magnitude of the impact is relatively small. For example,
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Table 3: Results Varying corr
corr rMSE MND MAB
0.20 0.0488 0.0417 0.0053
0.50 0.0489 0.0435 0.0186
0.75 0.0763 0.0690 0.0506
0.90 0.1010 0.0951 0.0743
Table 4: Results under Asymmetry
d = 3 rMSE MND MAB d = 4 rMSE MND MAB
N = 50 0.1498 0.1403 0.0936 N = 50 0.2225 0.2124 0.1521
N = 100 0.1096 0.1028 0.0741 N = 100 0.1751 0.1695 0.1301
N = 200 0.0943 0.0893 0.0672 N = 200 0.1595 0.1555 0.1222
rMSE only increases from 0.0488 to 0.1010 when corr increase dramatically from 0.2 to 0.9.
Similar pattern is also observed using other performance metrics. Therefore, our estimator
is robust against correlation between X and A.
4.3 Results under Asymmetric Pairwise Observable Characteris-
tics
In this section, we investigate how our method works when Wij is asymmetric. To introduce
asymmetry, we construct W
(d)
ij =
∣∣∣∣2X(d)i −X(d)j ∣∣∣∣ × (2/3) for each i, j pair. The reason for
multiplying 2/3 is to make the size ofW
(d)
ij similar to other coordinates ofWij . As discussed
before, under our DGP W
(d)
ij 6= W
(d)
ji unless
∣∣∣∣X(d)i ∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣X(d)j ∣∣∣∣, which is a probability zero
event. For d = 1, ..., d− 1, we follow the configuration for W (d)ij mentioned in section 4.1 for
the asymmetric case. We maintain other distributional assumptions for X,A, ǫ and fix the
number of (i, j) pairsM at 1000 for evaluation of Q̂ (β). Finally, we vary N and D under the
asymmetric setting to show how our estimator performs. Table 4 summarizes the results.
From Table 4 one can see our method performs reasonably well when Wij is asymmetric.
First, when the number of individuals N increases, the overall performance is improved, with
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rMSE decreasing from 0.1498 to 0.0943 for d = 3 and from 0.2225 to 0.1595 for d = 4 when
N increases from 50 to 200. This result is caused by the more information available in the
sample and echos what we have seen for the symmetric Wij case. When the dimension of
Wij d increases from 3 to 4, the performance is worse, with rMSE increasing from 0.0943
to 0.1595 for N = 200. It shows that more data (information) is required for accurate
estimation when the dimension of β0 is larger. Second, when compared with the symmetric
Wij case, the overall performance under asymmetry inWij is worse, with rMSE being 0.1498
for asymmetric Wij versus 0.0839 for symmetric Wij when N = 50 and d = 3. In Appendix
A.5 we discuss the implications of asymmetric Wij . It is shown there the identifying power
of the objective function is in general “less restrictive” than the corresponding identifying
restriction in Lemma 1. Therefore, one would expect larger bias than symmetric Wij case,
which is exactly what one observes in Table 4. Recall that we set total number of (i, j) pairs
for the evaluation of objective function M to be 1000 for all simulations. Based on results in
Table 4, when Wij is asymmetric and computational power allows, we suggest one increases
M to improve performance.
5 Empirical Illustration
As an empirical illustration, we estimate a network formation model under NTU with data of
a small village network called Nyakatoke in Tanzania. Nyakatoke is a small Haya community
of 119 households in 2000 located in the Kagera Region of Tanzania. We are interested in how
important factors, such as wealth, distance, and blood or religious ties, are relative to each
other in deciding the formation of risk-sharing links among local residents. The estimation
results demonstrate that our proposed method produces estimates that are consistent with
economic intuition.
5.1 Data Description
The risk-sharing data of Nyakatoke, collected by Joachim De Weerdt in 2000, cover all of
the 119 households in the community. It includes the information about whether or not two
households are linked in the insurance network. It also provides detailed information on total
USD assets and religion of each household, as well as kinship and distance between house-
holds. See De Weerdt (2004); De Weerdt and Dercon (2006); De Weerdt and Fafchamps
(2011) for more details of this dataset.
To define the dependent variable link, the interviewer asks each household the following
question:
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“Can you give a list of people from inside or outside of Nyakatoke, who you can personally
rely on for help and/or that can rely on you for help in cash, kind or labor?”
The data contains three answers of “bilaterally mentioned”, “unilaterally mentioned”,
and “not mentioned” between each pair of households. Considering the question is about
whether one can rely on the other for help, we interpret both “bilaterally mentioned” and
“unilaterally mentioned” as they are connected in this undirected network, meaning that
link equals 1. We also run a robustness check by constructing a weighted network based
on the answers, i.e. “bilaterally mentioned” means link equals 2, “unilaterally mentioned”
means link equals 1, and “not mentioned” means link equals 0, and found that results are
very similar.
We estimate the coefficients for wealth difference, distance and tie between households
with our two-step estimator. Wealth is defined as the total assets in USD owned by each
household in 2000, including livestocks, durables and land. Distance measures how far away
two households are located in kilometers. Tie is a discrete variable, defined to be 3 if members
of one household are parents, children and/or siblings of members of the other household,
2 if nephews, nieces, aunts, cousins, grandparents and grandchildren, 1 if any other blood
relation applies or if two households share the same religion, and 0 if no blood religious tie
exists. Following the literature we take natural log on wealth and distance, and we construct
the wealth difference variable as tthe absolute difference in wealth.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the insurance network in Nyakatoke. Each node
in the graph represents a household. The solid line between two nodes indicates they are
connected, i.e., link equals 1. The size of each node is proportional to the USD wealth of
each household. Each node is colored according to its rank in wealth: green for the top
quartile, red for the second, yellow for the third and purple for the fourth quartile.
In the dataset there are 5 households that lack information on wealth and/or distance.
We drop these observations, resulting in a sample size N of 114. The total number of ordered
household pairs is 12,882. Summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables
used in our analysis are presented in Table 5.
5.2 Methodology
To estimate β0, we need to first estimate ρi (x) := E
[
Dik
∣∣∣i,Wik = w] in order to construct
τij (·). We use the second degree spline sieve with its knot at the median to estimate ρi (w).
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Figure 1: A Graphical Illustration of the Insurance Network of Nyakatoke
Table 5: Empirical Application: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
link 12,882 0.0732 0.2606 0 1
|(ln) wealth difference| 12,882 1.0365 0.8228 0.0004 5.8898
(ln) distance 12,882 6.0553 0.7092 2.6672 7.4603
tie 12,882 0.4260 0.6123 0.0000 3.0000
24
Table 6: Empirical Application: Estimation Results
Variable βˆm
[
βˆl, βˆu
]
|(ln) wealth difference| -0.1948 [−0.1964, −0.1932]
(ln) distance -0.8036 [−0.8043, −0.8029]
tie 0.5619 [0.5608, 0.5630]
Specifically, for each household i in the data, we regress dependent variable link Dik on each
dimension of Wik, W
2
ik, and
[
(Wik −median (Wik))+
]2
including constant for k 6= i. The
reason why we could regress on basis functions constructed with W instead of X is because
X affects D only through W . We obtain an estimator ρˆi (·) evaluated at each realized
Wik = w in the data for each household i. We also smooth each component of τij (·), i.e.
1 {ρi (w) > ρj (w)} and 1 {ρi (w) < ρj (w)} with normal CDF to improve the performance.
In the second stage, we estimate β0 with βˆ that minimizes the sample criterion Q̂ (β) by
adapting to the adaptive-grid search on the unit sphere algorithm developed in Gao and Li
(2020). As shown in finite sample simulations, the method is able to converge fast to the
area that contains true β0.
5.3 Results and Discussion
Table 6 summarizes our estimation results. The column of βˆm corresponds to the center of
the estimated rectangle Ξˆ. We will use it as the point estimator of the coefficients for each
variable of W vector.
[
βˆl, βˆu
]
corresponds to the upper and lower bound of Ξˆ. While the
scale of β0 is unidentified, we can still compare the estimated coefficients with each other to
obtain an idea about which variable affects the formation of the link more than the other.
The estimated coefficients for each variable conform well with economic intuition. Our
method estimate the coefficient for absolute wealth difference to be negative in the range
of [−0.1964, −0.1932], which implies the more absolute difference in wealth between two
households, the lower likelihood they are connected. The estimated set for distance is
[−0.8043, −0.8029]. It is natural households rely more on neighbors for help than ones that
live farther away. The estimated coefficient for tie falls in the positive range of [0.5608, 0.5630],
which is also consistent with economic intuition that one would depend on support from fam-
ily when negative shock occurs.
It is worth mentioning the estimated set Ξˆ is very tight in each dimension, with a max-
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imum width of 0.0032 for tie. Usually the discreteness could make the estimated set wide,
but our algorithm is able to circumvent this issue by leveraging the large support in the two
other continuous variables, i.e., wealth difference and distance. The relative magnitude and
sign of coefficient for tie are estimated in line with expectation. The empirical results show
that our proposed estimator is able to generate economically intuitive estimates under NTU.
6 Conclusion
This paper considers a semiparametric model of dyadic network formation under nontrans-
ferable utilities, a natural and realistic micro-theoretical feature that translates into the lack
of additive separability in econometric modeling. We show how a new methodology called
logical differencing can be leveraged to cancel out the two-way fixed effects, which corre-
spond to unobserved individual heterogeneity, without relying on arithmetic additivity. The
key idea is to exploit the logical implication of weak multivariate monotonicity and use the
intersection of mutually exclusive events on the unobserved fixed effects. It would be inter-
esting to explore whether and how the idea of logical differencing, or more generally the use
of fundamental logical operations, can be applied to other econometric settings.
Simulation results show that our method performs reasonably well with a relatively small
sample size, and robust to various configurations. The empirical illustration using the real
network data of Nyakatoke reveals that our method is able to capture the essence of the net-
work formation process by generating estimates that conform well with economic intuition.
This paper also reveals several further research questions regarding dyadic network for-
mation models under the NTU setting. First, given the observation that the NTU setting
can capture “homophily effects” with respect to the unobserved heterogeneity (under log-
concave error distributions) while imposing monotonicity in the unobserved heterogeneity in
the same time, it is interesting to investigate whether we can differentiate homophily effects
generated by “intrinsic preference” from homophily effects generated by bilateral consent,
NTU and log-concave errors. Second, admittedly the identifying restriction obtained in this
paper becomes uninformative when we have antisymmetric pairwise observable characteris-
tics. However, preliminary analysis based on an adaption of Gao (2020) to the NTU setting
suggests that individual unobserved heterogeneity can be nonparametrically identified up to
location and inter-quantile range normalizations. After the identification of individual unob-
served heterogeneity terms (Ai), it becomes straightforward to identify the index parameter
β0 based on the observable characteristics, even in the presence of antisymmetric pairwise
characteristics. However, consistent estimators of Ai and β0 in a semiparametric framework
based on identification strategy in Gao (2020) are still being developed. We thus leave these
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research questions to future work.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Donald W. K. Andrews, Xiaohong Chen, Yuichi
Kitamura, and Peter C. B. Phillips for detailed comments, suggestions, and discussions.
We also thank Isaiah Andrews, Yann Bramoullé, Benjamin Connault, and Paul Goldsmith-
Pinkham, as well as seminar and conference participants at Yale University, the International
Conference for Game Theory at Stony Brook University (2019), the Young Economist Sym-
posium at Columbia University (2019), and the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric
Society at Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla (2019) for their comments. All
errors are our own.
References
Arduini, T., E. Patacchini, and E. Rainone (2015): “Parametric and Semiparametric
IV Estimation of Network Models with Selectivity,” Working paper, Einaudi Institute for
Economics and Finance (EIEF).
Auerbach, E. (2016): “Identification and Estimation of Models with Endogenous Network
Formation,” Tech. rep., Working Paper.
Aumann, R. J. (1967): “A survey of cooperative games without side payments,” Essays in
mathematical economics, 3–27.
Bagnoli, M. and T. Bergstrom (2005): “Log-concave probability and its applications,”
Economic theory, 26, 445–469.
Bierens, H. J. (1983): “Uniform Consistency of Kernel Estimators of a Regression Function
under Generalized Conditions,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 78, 699–
707.
Blitzstein, J. and P. Diaconis (2011): “A sequential importance sampling algorithm
for generating random graphs with prescribed degrees,” Internet mathematics, 6, 489–522.
Boucher, V. (2015): “Structural homophily,” International Economic Review, 56, 235–264.
Candelaria, L. E. (2016): “A Semiparametric Network Formation Model with Multiple
Linear Fixed Effects,” Working paper, Duke University.
Chandrasekhar, A. (2016): “Econometrics of network formation,” The Oxford Handbook
of the Economics of Networks, 303–357.
27
Charbonneau, K. B. (2017): “Multiple fixed effects in binary response panel data models,”
The Econometrics Journal, 20, S1–S13.
Chatterjee, S., P. Diaconis, and A. Sly (2011): “Random graphs with a given degree
sequence,” The Annals of Applied Probability, 1400–1435.
Chen, X. (2007): “Large Sample Sieve Estimation of Semi-Nonparametric Models,” in
Handbook of Econometrics, Elsevier B.V., vol. 6B.
Currarini, S., M. O. Jackson, and P. Pin (2009): “An economic model of friendship:
Homophily, minorities, and segregation,” Econometrica, 77, 1003–1045.
——— (2010): “Identifying the roles of race-based choice and chance in high school friendship
network formation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 4857–4861.
Currarini, S., J. Matheson, and F. Vega-Redondo (2016): “A simple model of
homophily in social networks,” European Economic Review, 90, 18–39.
de Paula, A. (2016): “Econometrics of network models,” Tech. rep., cemmap working
paper, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice.
De Paula, Á., S. Richards-Shubik, and E. Tamer (2018): “Identifying preferences in
networks with bounded degree,” Econometrica, 86, 263–288.
De Weerdt, J. (2004): “Risk-sharing and Endogenous Group Formation ?, chapter 10 in
Dercon, S.(ed.), Insurance against Poverty, Oxford University Press,” .
De Weerdt, J. and S. Dercon (2006): “Risk-sharing Networks and Insurance against
Illness,” Journal of Development Economics, 81, 337–356.
De Weerdt, J. and M. Fafchamps (2011): “Social identity and the formation of health
insurance networks,” Journal of Development Studies, 47, 1152–1177.
Dzemski, A. (2017): “An empirical model of dyadic link formation in a network with
unobserved heterogeneity,” Working paper.
Gao, W. Y. (2020): “Nonparametric Identification in Index Models of Link Formation,”
Journal of Econometrics, 215, 399–413.
Gao, W. Y. and M. Li (2020): “Robust Semiparametric Estimation in Panel Multinomial
Choice Models,” Working Paper.
28
Goldsmith-Pinkham, P. and G. W. Imbens (2013): “Social networks and the identifi-
cation of peer effects,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 31, 253–264.
Graham, B. S. (2015): “Methods of identification in social networks,” Annual Review of
Economics, 7, 465–485.
——— (2016): “Homophily and transitivity in dynamic network formation,” Tech. rep.,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
——— (2017): “An econometric model of network formation with degree heterogeneity,”
Econometrica, 85, 1033–1063.
Hart, S. (1985): “Nontransferable utility games and markets: some examples and the
Harsanyi solution,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1445–1450.
Hsieh, C.-S. and L. F. Lee (2016): “A social interactions model with endogenous friend-
ship formation and selectivity,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 31, 301–319.
Jackson, M. O. and A. Wolinsky (1996): “A strategic model of social and economic
networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 44–74.
Jochmans, K. (2017): “Semiparametric analysis of network formation,” Journal of Busi-
ness & Economic Statistics, 1–9.
Johnsson, I. and H. R. Moon (2017): “Estimation of peer effects in endogenous social
networks: control function approach,” Working paper.
Leung, M. (2015): “A Random-Field Approach to Inference in Large Models of Network
Formation,” Working paper.
McLean, R. P. (2002): “Values of non-transferable utility games,” Handbook of Game
Theory with Economic Applications, 3, 2077–2120.
Mele, A. (2017a): “A structural model of dense network formation,” Econometrica, 85,
825–850.
——— (2017b): “A Structural Model of Homophily and Clustering in Social Networks,”
Working paper.
Menzel, K. (2015): “Strategic network formation with many agents,” Tech. rep., New York
University.
29
Moody, J. (2001): “Race, school integration, and friendship segregation in America,” Amer-
ican journal of Sociology, 107, 679–716.
Newey, W. K. and D. McFadden (1994): “Chapter 36 large sample estimation and
hypothesis testing. volume 4 of Handbook of Econometrics,” .
Nolan, D. and D. Pollard (1987): “U-processes: rates of convergence,” The Annals of
Statistics, 780–799.
Ridder, G. and S. Sheng (2017): “Estimation of large network formation games,” Tech.
rep., Working papers, UCLA.
Serfling, R. J. (2009): Approximation theorems of mathematical statistics, vol. 162, John
Wiley & Sons.
Sherman, R. P. (1994): “Maximal inequalities for degenerate U-processes with applications
to optimization estimators,” The Annals of Statistics, 439–459.
Shi, Z. and X. Chen (2016): “A Structural Network Pairwise Regression Model with
Individual Heterogeneity,” CUHK Working Paper.
Toth, P. (2017): “Semiparametric estimation in network formation models with homophily
and degree heterogeneity,” SSRN 2988698.
Xu, Y. and L. Fan (2018): “Diverse friendship networks and heterogeneous peer effects
on adolescent misbehaviors,” Education Economics, 26, 233–252.
Yan, T., B. Jiang, S. E. Fienberg, and C. Leng (2018): “Statistical inference in a
directed network model with covariates,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.04558v4.
Yan, T., C. Leng, and J. Zhu (2016): “Asymptotics in directed exponential random
graph models with an increasing bi-degree sequence,” The Annals of Statistics, 44, 31–57.
Yan, T. and J. Xu (2013): “A central limit theorem in the β-model for undirected random
graphs with a diverging number of vertices,” Biometrika, 100, 519–524.
30
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For notational simplicity, we denote ∆(x; xi, xj) to be w(xi, x)− w(xj , x) and dβ by
m. It follows that
λij (x, x; xi, xj ; β) = 1
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≤ 0
}
1
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≥ 0
}
. (23)
Therefore, the event (16) is equivalent to
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β0 > 0
}
∪
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β0 < 0
}
and
the event (17) is equivalent to
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≤ 0
}
∩
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≥ 0
}
. By Assumption
3, there exist xi and xj in Supp (Xi) such that ∆ (Xk; xi, xj) has full directional support.
Hence, given any β0 and β 6= β0 in Sm−1, there exists some x ∈ Supp (Xi) such that
∆ (x; xi, xj)
′
β0 > 0 AND ∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≤ 0,
and some x ∈ Supp (Xi) such that
∆ (x; xi, xj)
′
β0 < 0 AND ∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≥ 0.
Hence, (16) and (17) hold simultaneously with strictly positive probability. Denote the set
of (xi, xj, x, x) satisfying these restrictions by
Ξ :=
(xi, xj , x, x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β0 > 0, ∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β0 < 0,
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≤ 0, and ∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β ≥ 0.
 . (24)
Note that Ξij occurs with strictly positive probability.
For such a combination of xi, xj , x, and x, we show next the event (15) holds with
strictly positive probability. According to the fact that
{
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β0 > 0
}
holds for xi,
xj , x, and x, under Assumption 5 there exists some ǫ1 > 0 such that ρi(x) > ρj(x) whenever
|Ai−Aj| ≤ ǫ1. This is true because when the difference between Ai and Aj is small enough,
the relative magnitude of ρi (x) compared to ρj (x) will be solely determined by whether
∆(x; xi, xj)
′
β0 > 0 or not according to (7). Similarly, there exists some ǫ2 > 0 such that
ρi(x) < ρj(x) whenever |Ai − Aj| ≤ ǫ2. Thus, there exists some ǫ := min {ǫ1, ǫ2} such that
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P {τij (x, x) = 1} ≥ P {|Ai − Aj| ≤ ǫ, (xi, xj , x, x) ∈ Ξ}
= P {|Ai −Aj | ≤ ǫ| (xi, xj , x, x) ∈ Ξ}P {(xi, xj, x, x) ∈ Ξ}
> 0, (25)
where the first inequality holds by {|Ai − Aj| ≤ ǫ, (xi, xj , x, x) ∈ Ξ} is sufficient for {τij (x, x) = 1}
and the last inequality holds by Assumption 4.
Therefore, we conclude the three events (15), (16), and (17), hold simultaneously with
strictly positive probability for some xi, xj , x, and x all in the support of X.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By Lemma 1, we have β0 ∈ argminβ∈Sm−1 Q(β) because Q (β0) = 0 ≤ Q (β) by
the construction of the population criterion Q (·). Furthermore, we have β0 is the unique
minimizer of Q(β) because for any β 6= β0, we have
Q (β) = E [λij (x, x; xi, xj ; β) τij (x, x)]
= P {{λij (x, x; xi, xj; β) = 1} ∩ {τij (x, x) = 1}} > 0, (26)
where the first equality holds by (14) and the last inequality holds by Lemma 2.
Next, we show that Sm−1 is a compact set and Q(β) is continuous on Sm−1, which
together with the uniqueness of β0 shown in (26) guarantee the identification result holds by
Newey and McFadden (1994). The former claim is true by the definition of Sm−1. To prove
the continuity of Q (β), define
gij (z, β) := λij (x, x; xi, xj; β) τij (x, x) (27)
and let z denote (x, x; xi, xj). Following Newey and McFadden (1994), the sufficient condi-
tion for the continuity of Q (β) is
(i) P {gij (z, β) is continuous at β = β
∗} = 1 for every β∗ ∈ Sm−1, and
(ii) E supβ∈Sm−1 |gij (z, β)| <∞.
Part (i) is true because λij (x, x; xi, xj ; β) is a binary function of z = (x, x; xi, xj) and
the change in value from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 only occurs when d(x; xi, xj)
′
β = 0 or
d(x; xi, xj)
′
β = 0. Under Assumption 3, these two events have zero probability of happening.
Thus, part (i) is verified. For part (ii), note that by construction gij (z, β) ∈ {0, 1} is a
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bounded function of β for all z. Therefore,
E sup
β∈Sm−1
|gij (z, β)| ≤ 1 <∞. (28)
Hence we have for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
inf
β∈Sm−1\B(β0,ǫ)
Q (β) ≥ Q (β0) + δ, (29)
where B (β0, ǫ) :=
{
β ∈ Sm−1 : ‖β − β0‖ ≤ ǫ
}
.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Define the infeasible criterion Q˜n (β) as
Q˜n (β) :=
(n− 4)!
n!
∑
1≤i6=j 6=k 6=l≤n
1 {ρi(Xk) > ρj(Xk)} · 1 {ρi(Xl) < ρj(Xl)}
×
 1 {d(Xk;Xi, Xj)′β ≤ 0}
×1
{
d(Xl;Xi, Xj)
′
β ≥ 0
}
 . (30)
By triangular inequality, we have
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)− Q˜ (β)∣∣∣+ sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q˜ (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ . (31)
According to the decomposition (31), we divide our proof into two steps.
Step I. supβ∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)− Q˜ (β)∣∣∣ p−→ 0.
By the fact that λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β) is either 0 or 1 for any β ∈ S
m−1, we have
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)− Q˜ (β)∣∣∣
=
(n− 4)!
n!
∑
1≤i6=j 6=k 6=l≤n
sup
β∈Sm−1
|λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β)|
×
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1 {ρi(Xk) > ρj(Xk)} · 1 {ρi(Xl) < ρj(Xl)}−1{ρˆi(Xk) > ρˆj(Xk)} ·1{ρˆi(Xl) < ρˆj(Xl)}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(n− 4)!
n!
∑
1≤i6=j 6=k 6=l≤n
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1 {ρi(Xk) > ρj(Xk)} · 1 {ρi(Xl) < ρj(Xl)}−1{ρˆi(Xk) > ρˆj(Xk)} ·1{ρˆi(Xl) < ρˆj(Xl)}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(n− 4)!
n!
∑
1≤i6=j 6=k 6=l≤n
 |1 {ρi(Xk) > ρj(Xk)} − 1{ρˆi(Xk) > ρˆj(Xk)} |
+ |1 {ρi(Xl) < ρj(Xl)} − 1{ρˆi(Xl) < ρˆj(Xl)} |
 ,
(32)
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where the first inequality uses |λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β)| is bounded from above by 1 and the
last inequality uses the fact that whenever the lhs of the last inequality equals 1, the rhs
must always equals 1.
It follows that
E sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)− Q˜ (β)∣∣∣
≤ E |1 {ρi(Xk) > ρj(Xk)} − 1{ρˆi(Xk) > ρˆj(Xk)} |
+ E |1 {ρi(Xl) < ρj(Xl)} − 1{ρˆi(Xl) < ρˆj(Xl)} | (33)
By Assumption 6, we obtain
E sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)− Q˜ (β)∣∣∣→ 0 (34)
using Dominated Convergence Theorem.
Finally, by Markov inequality, we have
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)− Q˜ (β)∣∣∣ p−→ 0. (35)
Step II. supβ∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q˜n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ p−→ 0.
For this part of the proof, we adapt to section 9.5 of Toth (2017) and use existing results
from the U-process literature. We have
{
Q˜n (β)−Q (β) : β ∈ Sm−1
}
is a centered U-process
of order 4. We follow the arguments from the seminal papers Nolan and Pollard (1987) and
Sherman (1994). For a systematic understanding of U-statistics, we refer the readers to
Serfling (2009).
First, we show
{
Q˜n (β)−Q (β) : β ∈ Sm−1
}
is Euclidean for the constant envelope of 1
(See Definition 8 in Nolan and Pollard (1987)). To see why, first note that the unsymmetrized
kernel of Q˜n (β)−Q (β) for any β ∈ Sm−1 is defined to be
kernel := λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj ; β)1 {ρi(Xk) > ρj(Xk)}
× ·1 {ρi(Xl) < ρj(Xl)}
− E
[
τij (Xk, Xl) · λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj ; β)
]
. (36)
The kernel defined in (36) belongs to a Euclidean class if and only if the function class of
λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β) indexed by β is Euclidean because the property is closed under finite
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addition, multiplication and linear operations, see Nolan and Pollard (1987). By (23), we
have
λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β) = 1
{
d(Xk;Xi, Xj)
′
β ≤ 0
}
1
{
d(Xl;Xi, Xj)
′
β ≥ 0
}
. (37)
Note that the function class of λij (Xk, Xl;Xi, Xj; β) indexed by β is Euclidean if and only if
the function class of d(Xk;Xi, Xj)
′
β is Euclidean, again by closure under finite multiplication
and indicator functions.
Define the function class G of g (X;Y, Z) := d(X;Y, Z)
′
β to be
G :=
{
d(X;Y, Z)
′
β
∣∣∣β ∈ Sm−1} . (38)
We have G forms a finite dimensional vector space of functions as long asm <∞. By Lemma
18 of Nolan and Pollard (1987), the collection of all sets of the form {g ≥ 0} or {g ≤ 0} or
{g > 0} or {g < 0} for any g ∈ G is a polynomial class, which implies {graph (g) : g ∈ G } is
a polynomial class of sets because any class of subsets of R is a polynomial class. From this
result and Lemma 19 of Nolan and Pollard (1987), we have G is Euclidean. Therefore, the
kernel defined in (36) indeed belongs to a Euclidean class, and according to Corollary 7 in
Sherman (1994), we have
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q˜n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ p−→ 0. (39)
Combining (35) and (39), we have
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ p−→ 0. (40)
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We aim to prove, for any ǫ > 0, P
(
‖β̂n − β0‖
)
> ǫ → 0. According to the proof in
Theorem 1, we have for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that infβ∈Sm−1\Bm(β0,ǫ) Q (β) ≥
Q (β0) + δ, where Bm(β0, ǫ) =
{
β ∈ Sm−1 : ‖β − β0‖ ≤ ǫ
}
. It follows that there exist δ > 0
such that
P
(
‖β̂n − β0‖ > ǫ
)
= P
(
β̂n ∈ S
m−1\Bm (β0, ǫ)
)
≤ P
(
Q
(
β̂n
)
≥ Q (β0) + δ
)
. (41)
By construction of β̂n, we have Q̂n(β̂n)− Q̂n(β0) ≤ 0. Therefore,
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P(
Q(β̂n) ≥ Q(β0) + δ
)
= P
(
Q(β̂n)− Q̂n(β̂n) + Q̂n(β̂n)− Q̂n(β0) + Q̂n(β0)−Q(β0) ≥ δ
)
≤ P
(
Q(β̂n)− Q̂n(β̂n) + 0 + Q̂n(β0)−Q(β0) ≥ δ
)
.
(42)
It follows that
P
(
Q(β̂n) ≥ Q(β0) + δ
)
≤ P
(
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ ≥ δ/2
)
. (43)
By Lemma 3, we have for any δ > 0
P
(
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ ≥ δ/2
))
→ 0 as n→∞. (44)
Therefore, we have for any ǫ > 0
P
(
‖β̂n − β0‖ > ǫ
)
≤ P
(
sup
β∈Sm−1
∣∣∣Q̂n (β)−Q (β)∣∣∣ ≥ δ/2
)
→ 0 as n→∞. (45)
A.5 Asymmetry of Pairwise Observable Characteristics
So far we have been focusing on the case with symmetric pairwise observable characteristics,
i.e.,
w (Xi, Xj) ≡ w (Xj, Xi) .
In this section, we briefly discuss how our method can be adapted to accommodate asym-
metric pairwise observable characteristics.
As in Remark 1, consider the adapted model (6):
E [Dij |Xi, Xj, Ai, Aj ] = φ
(
w (Xi, Xj)
′
β0, w (Xj, Xi)
′
β0, Ai, Aj
)
(46)
where w needs not be symmetric with respect to its two vector arguments and φ : R4 → R
is required to be monotone in all its four arguments.
The technique of logical differencing still applies in the exactly same way as before.
Specifically, the event
{
ρi (x) > ρj (x)
}
implies that
{
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (x,Xi)
′
β0 > w
(
x,Xj
)′
β0
}
OR
{
Ai > Aj
}
,
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while the event
{
ρi (x) < ρj (x)
}
implies that
{
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (x,Xi)
′
β0 < w
(
x,Xj
)′
β0
}
OR
{
Ai < Aj
}
.
The joint occurrence of
{
ρi (x) > ρj (x)
}
and
{
ρi (x) < ρj (x)
}
now implies that
{
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (x,Xi)
′
β0 > w
(
x,Xj
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 < w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (x,Xi)
′
β0 < w
(
x,Xj
)′
β0
}
, (47)
which is in general “less restrictive” than the corresponding identifying restriction in Lemma
1.
In particular, in the extreme case where w is antisymmetric in the sense of
w (Xi, Xj) ≡ −w (Xj , Xi) ,
the identifying restriction on the RHS of{
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 > w
(
Xj , x
)′
β0
}
OR
{
w (x,Xi)
′
β0 > w
(
x,Xj
)′
β0
}
becomes {
w (Xi, x)
′
β0 6= w
(
Xj, x
)′
β0
}
,
which can be generically true and thus becomes (almost) trivial.
Correspondingly, Assumption 3 needs to be strengthened for point identification:
Assumption (3a). There exist a pair of x, x, both of which lie in the support of Supp (Xi),
such that
Supp (w (x,Xi)− w (x,Xi)) ∩ Supp (w (Xi, x)− w (Xi, x))
contains all directions in Rm.
Clearly, the case of antisymmetric w is ruled out by Assumption 3a. Assumption A.5
ensures that, for any β 6= β0, there exist in-support xi and xj such that
{
w (xi, Xk)
′
β0 > w (xj , Xk)
′
β0
}
AND
{
w (xi, Xl)
′
β0 < w (xj , Xl)
′
β0
}
AND
{
w (Xk, xi)
′
β0 > w (Xk, xj)
′
β0
}
AND
{
w (Xl, xi)
′
β0 < w (Xl, xj)
′
β0
}
(48)
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and
{
w (xi, Xk)
′
β ≤ w (xj , Xk)
′
β
}
AND
{
w (xi, Xl)
′
β ≥ w (xj , Xl)
′
β
}
AND
{
w (Xk, xi)
′
β ≤ w (Xk, xj)
′
β
}
AND
{
w (Xl, xi)
′
β ≥ w (Xl, xj)
′
β
}
(49)
occur simultaneously with strictly positive probability. (48) and (49) are sufficient for{
ρi (x) > ρj (x)
}
and
{
ρi (x) < ρj (x)
}
to occur simultaneously under the maintained as-
sumption on the support of Ai. It thus can guarantee point identification of β0.
The estimator can be correspondingly adapted in an obvious manner.
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